The Ukraine war thread
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@Jolly I've read that Ukraine still has 80% of their fighters.
Seems like that strategy is working.
As to guided munitions, I remember reading that they are dependent upon encrypted data, and Ukraine has really screwed that up. I may be a bit off here, so bear with me...
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@George-K said in The Ukraine war thread:
@jon-nyc said in The Ukraine war thread:
European defense official estimates Russian KIA at 7-9k “as of a few days ago”.
Holy crap. No wonder the Belarus army is saying "No way, Jose" to going in... At some point this has to start hitting hard on the homefront in Russia.
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Assessing the Russian Army Performance After One Week of War
Note: Title says "after one week," but it was published two days ago.
Takeaways:
Given the sheer number of units pulled from across Russia for the invasion, planning for the operation would have been a central military task for the General Staff. However, as the war grinds on, we are beginning to see cracks in the Russians’ planning. The opening air and missile attacks appear to have failed to defeat the Ukrainian air force and air-defense forces. Russian logistics planning may not have accounted for fuel shortages stemming from combat losses of transport vehicles or soldier indiscipline. Russian planners also seem to have underestimated the will of the Ukrainians to fight, the effectiveness of Western anti-tank and man-portable anti-aircraft weapons, and the will of the European nations to continue arming a defiant Ukrainian state.
Russian Army has not appeared to integrate a number of key combat multipliers effectively—good examples are coordinating airstrikes and employing electronic warfare (EW). The absence of overwhelming Russian airpower is perplexing. Reasons might include a lack of confidence in the coordination between Russian air and Ground Forces’ air defense units, the continued presence of Ukrainian anti-aircraft weapons, and the influx of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine. Commanders may also lack confidence in pushing too many aircraft into airspace filled with indirect artillery and rocket fires, especially given the vast number of firing units.
The Russians are operating with a complete absence of operational surprise. Commercial satellite imagery provides a fairly accurate picture of current Russian force dispositions, and every local Ukrainian with a cell phone has the ability to film and post Russian movements in real time. Journalists and pundits operating on social media further analyze these posts to geolocate and confirm their authenticity.
“Rasputitsa” is the Russian word for the spring and fall seasons of the year when cross-country mobility becomes difficult; traditionally, the spring Rasputitsa lasts to May. Along with an apparent lack of basic vehicle recovery procedures, this has resulted in Russian tracked and wheeled vehicles becoming stuck and often abandoned in muddy fields. Due to a lack of off-road mobility, the Russians are now road bound.
The Russian 12-month conscription term is too short to acquire advanced skills, leaving most conscripts to fill basic jobs like driver or crewman in the battalion tactical groups. Additionally, it is still early in the Russian winter training cycle, leaving many of the conscripts not fully trained.
Initial observations of the Russian operation indicate that planning for the early stages of the operation was faulty. Command and control was overly simplified, maneuver was constrained, and tactical proficiency lacking.
Viewed collectively, these shortcomings likely point to insufficient training or experience in military staffs. Past large-scale exercises were often scripted. This may be the first time many of the Combined Arms Army and lower echelon staff have planned such a complex operation. While many of the Russian commanders and surely select staff officers have combat experience in Syria, the majority of the staff likely do not. Deploying individual officers or select tactical units does not directly translate into experienced, functioning staff able to plan and execute combined arms combat operations, often while on the march.
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Possible good news for Taiwan:
https://www.cfr.org/blog/putins-aggression-against-ukraine-deals-blow-chinas-hopes-taiwan?amp
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@Renauda said in The Ukraine war thread:
Probably one of the best panel webinars on the subject in the past two weeks. Military, diplomatic and economic topics. Broadcast this am so it is fairly up to date:
Well worth your hour of time.
Agreed. The retired General was particularly interesting.
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@Renauda said in The Ukraine war thread:
Possible good news for Taiwan:
https://www.cfr.org/blog/putins-aggression-against-ukraine-deals-blow-chinas-hopes-taiwan?amp
makes alot of sense. I have been hearing the same.
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A different take on the situation. Would be curious as to what bach has to say:
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@Renauda said in The Ukraine war thread:
A different take on the situation. Would be curious as to what bach has to say:
In the Arab world, it is safe to say that the collective outrage in the West over the invasion of a weaker country by a stronger country is seen as conspicuously inconsistent. The US traveled 6,000 miles to invade Iraq over a non-existent threat, after all
Iraq was perceived as a threat by most intelligence services of western countries at the time. It may have been wrong, but it was not at the time. Because "after all."
It's interesting that the occupation of Kuwait is not mentioned.
while Russia has invaded a neighboring country that is well-stocked with weapons, and was seeking to join what they perceive to be as a hostile military alliance. The irony is not lost on the Arab public.
So perception of a threat is OK for the Russians, but not for the US?
But, an interesting article about "perceptions" of "threats".
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After we took Kuwait away from the Iraqis and gave it back to Kuwait, Kuwait was pretty friendly.
Actually Kuwait was pretty friendly before we removed Iraq.
The Shah's Iran was friendly enough, not so much after he retired.
Friendships run hot and cold, this is the way of the world.
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Iraq was perceived as a threat by most intelligence services of western countries at the time. It may have been wrong, but it was not at the time. Because "after all."
That's not how I remember it. Many called BS on the WMD hypothesis right from the start. I never bought it.
I for one think the actual reason was that the Bush administration thought they had to do something to fulfill desires of revenge about 9/11, and Iraq was convenient and geostrategically useful for that.
My impression is that many Americans have no idea about how devastating that war was with respect to the general sentiment towards the US in many parts of the world.
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There's a site that tracks equipment losses by Russia and Ukraine. It only lists verified losses (photos, etc), and also breaks down whether the equipment was destroyed, damaged, or abandoned.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
As of today:
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@Klaus said in The Ukraine war thread:
Very hard to get that data even remotely correct.
Presumably the availability of photos and videos is rather asymmetric for the two sides.
And it's almost impossible to avoid duplicates or fakes.
Even so, I think it's obvious that
- Ukraine is getting pummeled
- They're holding up far better than anyone expected.