The Ukraine war thread

@George-K said in The Ukraine war thread:

This could be a very good sign if Putin is looking for someone to blame internally. I have no sympathy for them at all.

But there were supposed to be leaks from the FSB assisting the Ukrainians. Any chance it was one of these 2?

Renauda

Probably one of the best panel webinars on the subject in the past two weeks. Military, diplomatic and economic topics. Broadcast this am so it is fairly up to date:

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/putins-war-wont-fly/?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGDE461da9mfL9mlmPRqhCBEsQMK5n5KX71ps6wEm-ji7CT6Zpy7KWpGqcko7PzrkpRBGVd0iXNxjnehyIQ8rWcueE5wAJFTOMETdWKQqCtZA

Well worth your hour of time.

Jolly

Heard the best thing on the actual fighting from a retired USAF bird colonel on the radio today.

His take? We know some big things, but a lot of what is going on is obscured by lack of intelligence, abundant propaganda on both sides and no firm numbers. He has been surprised by the lack of use of precision guided munitions...We know the Russians have them, as they used them in Syria, but the Russians have used dumb bombs for the vast majority of the campaign. Why? Nobody knows.

One thing he did address was the MIG-29 deal...He thought more planes would not be especially helpful for Ukraine. Reason? The Russians have perhaps the best SAM in the world for nonstealth aircraft...Without terrain, the kill zone is 50 miles. We know they are in the country and we know the have been deployed. The way the Ukranians have been able to use the aircraft they have, is by flying low, popping up and getting a few shots off and then immediately bugging out back on the deck. That mission profile is limited.

George K · "Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08

@Jolly I've read that Ukraine still has 80% of their fighters.

Seems like that strategy is working.

As to guided munitions, I remember reading that they are dependent upon encrypted data, and Ukraine has really screwed that up. I may be a bit off here, so bear with me...

George K · "Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08

@jon-nyc said in The Ukraine war thread:

European defense official estimates Russian KIA at 7-9k “as of a few days ago”.

LuFins Dad

@George-K said in The Ukraine war thread:

@jon-nyc said in The Ukraine war thread:

European defense official estimates Russian KIA at 7-9k “as of a few days ago”.

Holy crap. No wonder the Belarus army is saying "No way, Jose" to going in... At some point this has to start hitting hard on the homefront in Russia.

George K · "Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08

Assessing the Russian Army Performance After One Week of War

Note: Title says "after one week," but it was published two days ago.

Takeaways:

Given the sheer number of units pulled from across Russia for the invasion, planning for the operation would have been a central military task for the General Staff. However, as the war grinds on, we are beginning to see cracks in the Russians’ planning. The opening air and missile attacks appear to have failed to defeat the Ukrainian air force and air-defense forces. Russian logistics planning may not have accounted for fuel shortages stemming from combat losses of transport vehicles or soldier indiscipline. Russian planners also seem to have underestimated the will of the Ukrainians to fight, the effectiveness of Western anti-tank and man-portable anti-aircraft weapons, and the will of the European nations to continue arming a defiant Ukrainian state.

Russian Army has not appeared to integrate a number of key combat multipliers effectively—good examples are coordinating airstrikes and employing electronic warfare (EW). The absence of overwhelming Russian airpower is perplexing. Reasons might include a lack of confidence in the coordination between Russian air and Ground Forces’ air defense units, the continued presence of Ukrainian anti-aircraft weapons, and the influx of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine. Commanders may also lack confidence in pushing too many aircraft into airspace filled with indirect artillery and rocket fires, especially given the vast number of firing units.

The Russians are operating with a complete absence of operational surprise. Commercial satellite imagery provides a fairly accurate picture of current Russian force dispositions, and every local Ukrainian with a cell phone has the ability to film and post Russian movements in real time. Journalists and pundits operating on social media further analyze these posts to geolocate and confirm their authenticity.

“Rasputitsa” is the Russian word for the spring and fall seasons of the year when cross-country mobility becomes difficult; traditionally, the spring Rasputitsa lasts to May. Along with an apparent lack of basic vehicle recovery procedures, this has resulted in Russian tracked and wheeled vehicles becoming stuck and often abandoned in muddy fields. Due to a lack of off-road mobility, the Russians are now road bound.

The Russian 12-month conscription term is too short to acquire advanced skills, leaving most conscripts to fill basic jobs like driver or crewman in the battalion tactical groups. Additionally, it is still early in the Russian winter training cycle, leaving many of the conscripts not fully trained.

Initial observations of the Russian operation indicate that planning for the early stages of the operation was faulty. Command and control was overly simplified, maneuver was constrained, and tactical proficiency lacking.

Viewed collectively, these shortcomings likely point to insufficient training or experience in military staffs. Past large-scale exercises were often scripted. This may be the first time many of the Combined Arms Army and lower echelon staff have planned such a complex operation. While many of the Russian commanders and surely select staff officers have combat experience in Syria, the majority of the staff likely do not. Deploying individual officers or select tactical units does not directly translate into experienced, functioning staff able to plan and execute combined arms combat operations, often while on the march.

Renauda

Possible good news for Taiwan:

https://www.cfr.org/blog/putins-aggression-against-ukraine-deals-blow-chinas-hopes-taiwan?amp

jon-nyc

@Renauda said in The Ukraine war thread:

Probably one of the best panel webinars on the subject in the past two weeks. Military, diplomatic and economic topics. Broadcast this am so it is fairly up to date:

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/putins-war-wont-fly/?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGDE461da9mfL9mlmPRqhCBEsQMK5n5KX71ps6wEm-ji7CT6Zpy7KWpGqcko7PzrkpRBGVd0iXNxjnehyIQ8rWcueE5wAJFTOMETdWKQqCtZA

Well worth your hour of time.

Agreed. The retired General was particularly interesting.

George K · "Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08

@jon-nyc said in The Ukraine war thread:

Agreed. The retired General was particularly interesting.

That was, indeed, an hour well-spent. @Renauda , thanks for linking that.

taiwan_girl

@Renauda said in The Ukraine war thread:

Possible good news for Taiwan:

https://www.cfr.org/blog/putins-aggression-against-ukraine-deals-blow-chinas-hopes-taiwan?amp

makes alot of sense. I have been hearing the same.

Renauda

The Putin family photo:

The New Coffee Room

The Ukraine war thread