The Ukraine war thread
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From the Institute for the Study of War's Sept 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:
"Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s declarations about which categories of Russian males will be exempted from partial mobilization may not reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions or orders. A Russian media insider claimed on September 24 that officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reprimanded military commissars in person for negligence in carrying out mobilization and sending out summonses in “excess,” and contrary to the explicit MoD guidance regarding exemptions for age, disability, or other limiting factors. Another Russian source claimed that certain heads of federal subjects acknowledged that they have mobilized citizens who are technically ineligible.
"Responsibility for the partial mobilization appears to be divided and complex, possibly contributing to confusion, disorganization, and violations of Shoigu’s commitments regarding exemptions."
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An overlooked aspect of warfare, weapons maintenance and repair:
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Interesting article.
Wonder which systems get priority, assuming parts are available?
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BTW, there is a bit of talk about shipping the Spear (XM5) to Ukraine. Don't know the chambering, but considering logistical headaches, it would be something already fielded in-country.
Reasoning? Real-world combat tests.
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From the Institute for the Study of War:
"This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian military mobilization efforts. Significant inflections ISW would normally cover in its regular sections will be summarized briefly today and addressed in more detail tomorrow.
"Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to overcome fundamental structural challenges in attempting to mobilize large numbers of Russians to continue his war in Ukraine. The “partial mobilization” he ordered on September 21 will generate additional forces but inefficiently and with high domestic social and political costs. The forces generated by this “partial mobilization,” critically, are very unlikely to add substantially to the Russian military’s net combat power in 2022. Putin will have to fix basic flaws in the Russian military personnel and equipment systems if mobilization is to have any significant impact even in the longer term. His actions thus far suggest that he is far more concerned with rushing bodies to the battlefield than with addressing these fundamental flaws.
"The Russian Armed Forces have not been setting conditions for an effective large-scale mobilization since at least 2008 and have not been building the kind of reserve force needed for a snap mobilization intended to produce immediate effects on the battlefield. There are no rapid solutions to these problems."
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If Putin can keep it up, he can win a war of attrition, especially in tough economic times for the West.
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"A Russian military recruiter has been shot after a man opened fire in a mobilisation enlistment office, according to reports.
Ruslan Zinin, 25, shouted “no one is going to fight” before firing a shot gun in the enlistment office in Ust-IIimsk.
The shooting is believed to have taken place in protest against the forced mobilisation of civilian reservists for the war in Ukraine."
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"My pronouns are FA/FO." - Mik, 2024
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@Mik said in The Ukraine war thread:
How long can he continue to fight a war no one wants with an army that doesn't want to fight?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky on Vladimir Putin's historical achievement:
"Russia is most likely the first and only country in the world where people flee not because someone invaded their country, but because they invaded another country"
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@jon-nyc
And with this they expect to achieve what, exactly?This is like watching a tree fall in slow but inexorable motion.
Is Putin causing all this to happen on his own? Does he have anything like honest (if insane) support, or only yes-men feathering their own nests or staving off the Putin wrath by going through the motions?
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Latest word is that Putin plans to deliver (another) speech on Sept 30. On that occasion, he will announce the results of the (cough) referendum in the Eastern states, and therefore justification for annexation of those areas.
Once those are part of "Russia," escalation, either by more mobilization or by use of different weaponry will be on the table. After all, the Motherland is being attacked, dontcha know.
"Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08
The saying, "Lite is just one damn thing after another," is a gross understatement. The damn things overlap.
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From the Institute for the Study of War's Sept 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:
"The Kremlin is attempting to message its way out of the reality of major problems in the execution of its “partial mobilization,” but its narratives are unlikely to placate Russians who can perceive the real mistakes all around them.
"The Kremlin is deflecting blame for the Russian government’s failure to abide by its own stated criteria for mobilization and exemptions onto the failing bureaucratic institutions responsible for the mobilization. The Kremlin is downplaying the widespread violations of the mobilization law as individual errors of local authorities, claiming to correct these errors as citizens call attention to them. The violations are clearly too common to be merely the result of individual errors, however, and Russian citizens can see them all too clearly.
"Unlike Russian failures in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has been able to minimize or deflect because its citizens cannot see them directly, violations of the mobilization decree are evident to many Russians. Word of these violations does not even require access to media or social media, because they are occurring in so many locations and victims’ families can spread their anguish by word of mouth."
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CSTO is falling apart too. One of the rare good articles in Rolling Stone anymore.
