The Ukraine war thread
-
@George-K said in The Ukraine war thread:
@Mik said in The Ukraine war thread:
They can raise all the troops they want, but they won't be able to supply them.
And, as I said above, they get two weeks of training.
Fourteen days (of which they'll probably spend at least 6 dead-drunk).
Supposedly, these are guys who have served before. One day for in-processing, clothing and weapons issue, etc., and assignment to barracks. Then, weapon re-familiarization and what little training they can do.
They're going to be out of shape, have poor unit cohesion, slow to react and have piss-poor morale.
You are right. These can hardly be described as reservists by any definition other than they completed their one or two years of conscripted service sometime in the past decade or so. They probably know how to salute, parade drill and some basic small arms familiarisation. Sure the odd one might even have some very stale specialised combat arms training. Beyond that, not much.
-
We haven't even touched on motivation and morale. I'm thinking if these guys were suitable and supportive of Putin's war, they might well have already enlisted. And they didn't. You're going to have a whole army that doesn't want to be there and doesn't think they should be.
Planning to fail is a rare occurrence, but that is what we are seeing.
-
I guess Putin still thinks he can just grind the Ukranians down through sheer numbers and hope for an eventual slackening of support from the West for Ukraine.
OTOH, Russia is being bled men and materials, both of which may be impossible to replace.
Wonder when the internal political tipping point will be reached?
-
I guess Putin still thinks he can just grind the Ukranians down through sheer numbers and hope for an eventual slackening of support from the West for Ukraine.
OTOH, Russia is being bled men and materials, both of which may be impossible to replace.
Wonder when the internal political tipping point will be reached?
-
From the Institute for the Study of War's Sept 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:
"The Russian mobilization system is struggling to execute the task Russian President Vladimir Putin set and will likely fail to produce mobilized reserve forces even of the low quality that Putin’s plans would have generated, unless the Kremlin can rapidly fix fundamental and systemic problems.
"Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that the Russian Armed Forces would mobilize combat-ready reservists to quickly stabilize the frontlines and regain the initiative on the battlefield. Milblogger and social media reports, however, show that Russian military recruitment centers, enlistment officials, and local administrations are mobilizing men who do not meet the Kremlin’s stated criteria, especially Shoigu’s promise that mobilization would prioritize men with “combat experience.” Russian opposition outlets and Telegram channels leaked information suggesting that the Kremlin aims to complete this partial mobilization by November 10 and that the Kremlin is seeking to mobilize 1.2 million men instead of the publicly announced 300,000.
"ISW cannot verify these reports, but significant available information suggests that this mobilization campaign (the first in post-Soviet Russia) is overwhelming an ineffective and unmotivated bureaucratic system and could fail to generate the much-needed combat-ready reserve force in a short time or at all."
From the Institute for the Study of War's Sept 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:
"Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s declarations about which categories of Russian males will be exempted from partial mobilization may not reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions or orders. A Russian media insider claimed on September 24 that officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reprimanded military commissars in person for negligence in carrying out mobilization and sending out summonses in “excess,” and contrary to the explicit MoD guidance regarding exemptions for age, disability, or other limiting factors. Another Russian source claimed that certain heads of federal subjects acknowledged that they have mobilized citizens who are technically ineligible.
"Responsibility for the partial mobilization appears to be divided and complex, possibly contributing to confusion, disorganization, and violations of Shoigu’s commitments regarding exemptions."
Success is measured by your discipline and inner peace. – Mike Ditka
-
An overlooked aspect of warfare, weapons maintenance and repair:
-
From the Institute for the Study of War's Sept 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:
"Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s declarations about which categories of Russian males will be exempted from partial mobilization may not reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions or orders. A Russian media insider claimed on September 24 that officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reprimanded military commissars in person for negligence in carrying out mobilization and sending out summonses in “excess,” and contrary to the explicit MoD guidance regarding exemptions for age, disability, or other limiting factors. Another Russian source claimed that certain heads of federal subjects acknowledged that they have mobilized citizens who are technically ineligible.
"Responsibility for the partial mobilization appears to be divided and complex, possibly contributing to confusion, disorganization, and violations of Shoigu’s commitments regarding exemptions."
From the Institute for the Study of War:
"This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian military mobilization efforts. Significant inflections ISW would normally cover in its regular sections will be summarized briefly today and addressed in more detail tomorrow.
"Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to overcome fundamental structural challenges in attempting to mobilize large numbers of Russians to continue his war in Ukraine. The “partial mobilization” he ordered on September 21 will generate additional forces but inefficiently and with high domestic social and political costs. The forces generated by this “partial mobilization,” critically, are very unlikely to add substantially to the Russian military’s net combat power in 2022. Putin will have to fix basic flaws in the Russian military personnel and equipment systems if mobilization is to have any significant impact even in the longer term. His actions thus far suggest that he is far more concerned with rushing bodies to the battlefield than with addressing these fundamental flaws.
"The Russian Armed Forces have not been setting conditions for an effective large-scale mobilization since at least 2008 and have not been building the kind of reserve force needed for a snap mobilization intended to produce immediate effects on the battlefield. There are no rapid solutions to these problems."
-
"A Russian military recruiter has been shot after a man opened fire in a mobilisation enlistment office, according to reports.
Ruslan Zinin, 25, shouted “no one is going to fight” before firing a shot gun in the enlistment office in Ust-IIimsk.
The shooting is believed to have taken place in protest against the forced mobilisation of civilian reservists for the war in Ukraine."
-
“I am fond of pigs. Dogs look up to us. Cats look down on us. Pigs treat us as equals.” ~Winston S. Churchill
-
