The Ukraine war thread
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Don’t know about 16 yr. olds- actually I find it doubtful being that Russian kids do not start grade 1 until they are 7 and remain in school until they are 17. Military age is 18 yr.
My MIL though tells us that the authorities are again going to door to door ensuring that this spring’s intake of conscripts show up for medical assessment as scheduled. That was a common practice up until about ten years ago when supposed reforms were initiated and required service was reduced to one year from two. She also said select Reservists on the supplementary duty lists are being called up to report.
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@Renauda said in The Ukraine war thread:
Don’t know about 16 yr. olds- actually I find it doubtful being that Russian kids do not start grade 1 until they are 7 and remain in school until they are 17. Military age is 18 yr.
Yeah, it's the Mail.
Kremlin is accused of recruiting 'child soldiers'
The Kremlin has resorted to recruiting children to boost its troop numbers in eastern Ukraine, according to human rights officials.
In a bid to replace the estimated 30,000 soldiers either killed, wounded or captured so far in the war, Moscow is said to be recruiting from youth clubs and conscripting 16-year-olds.
So-called ‘patriotic clubs’ sprang up in Russian-occupied parts of eastern Ukraine following its invasion in 2014 as part of a campaign to promote the country’s culture in Luhansk and Donetsk.
The reports come as Ukraine has been forced to give volunteer civilians weapons training so that they can defend their cities. The training includes close defence tactics, use of weaponry, military tactics and first aid. Yesterday, Ukrainian officials called on the United Nations to investigate Russia’s alleged use of ‘child soldiers’.
According to human rights organisations, the children are undergoing military training and could be sent to the frontline – perhaps against their will.
Some may have already been thrust into action and lost their lives in the fighting.
Reports have also suggested the badges and insignia of Russian military cadets, who are also not supposed to be deployed to war zones, have been found on battlefields in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian parliament commissioner on human rights Lyudmyla Denisova said: ‘The occupation authorities [of Luhansk and Donetsk] are conducting the mobilisation of children who participated in the so-called patriotic clubs, to the levels of illegal weapons formations.
She also said select Reservists on the supplementary duty lists are being called up to report.
I've also read that military personnel discharged in the last 10 years are being called up.
Saw one report today that claimed 30K Russian KIA.
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I've also read that military personnel discharged in the last 10 years are being called up.
Those are the select reservists to which my MIL was referring. In Russia a trained conscript after he has completed his term of service can either remain a career soldier or, if he wishes to return to civilian life, is placed on a supplementary duty list until, I think, he reaches 35 yrs old or a specified period of time as noted on his military record. The military school for training engineers is in the city my outlaws live, and it is reservist engineers she says are presently being mustered back into service. I am sure though that similar calls ups are happening with other specialties throughout the country.
30k? KIA? That would mean a minimum of 90k wounded and MIA. I find that level of military incompetence hard to fathom - even for the Russians. If true it is already a meat grinder comparable to the Rzhev battles in WWII against the Nazis.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Rzhev
Also if true, Putin better declare victory and get out fast. He had also better hope that the Russian public buys that it is an unequivocal victory as well. Russian history has never smiled upon Tsars, politicians and generals who humiliate the motherland in war.
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Given the damage he has already done to Russia in world standing and economy, plus the apparent failure in Ukraine, I suspect he is weakened severely. Although from what I have been reading lately his decision to attack already came from a place of weakness and his history of bolstering his popularity through wars.
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@George-K said in The Ukraine war thread:
@Renauda said in The Ukraine war thread:
That’s my hunch as well. This time round logistics “should be” easier being that the whole of the Donbas borders Russia itself. However they are coming up against battle hardened Ukrainian troops in strong defensive positions. It could easily turn into a meat grinder if the Russians again rely on conscripts and the Ukrainians successfully continue to deploy the new weaponry coming into the country from NATO. In the end though I think just weight of numbers will eventually favour the Russians.
If the Kremlin can stop with the Donbas and the land corridor along the Sea of Azov to Crimea, that might be the victory sufficient to cause Putin to ratchet down his military campaign and engage in diplomacy. However, something tells me any negotiated armistice in the near future will be more result of mutual exhaustion on both sides and untenable in the long run so long as Putin remains in power.
Agreed. I feel this will not go well for the Ukrainians. The only positive things I see is the influx of weaponry and hardware from Europe and the US and the fact that the Russians are, more and more, relying on poorly-trained conscripts. I've read rumors that they are drafting 16 year olds into service.
The U.S. Army is currently training cannon cockers for the Ukranians. The cannon will be towed 155mm howitzers, and the guns will be the Ukranian's after training.
Little known fact...In WW2, the Russians were noted for the sheer volume of their artillery, but...The best artillery on the battlefield, bar none, was the U.S. Army. They perfected the use of the proximity fuse coupled with firing stonks. They are still the premier artillery units in the world.
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At best I think we can see a stalemate and a conditional armistice come out if this. Doubtful that Ukraine will ever cede and recognize any occupied territory as Russian and, for its part, Russia will never agree to allow what remains of Ukraine to become a NATO member without breaking the terms of the armistice. Likewise so long as there remains disputed territory between Russia and Ukraine, its not likely that an application by Ukraine to join can be considered.
Stalemate.
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Looks like Ukraine received some aircraft and spare parts although the Pentagon is not saying from whom or what type:
This weekend I read that Romania had offered Ukraine their hot rodded MiG 21 Lancers. Would make sense as the pilots and ground crews would have some familiarity with the aircraft.
Besides, it would make a good platform from which the Ukrainians could fire those Brimstone air to ground attack missiles they are about to receive from Britain.
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Read the thread on the Russian army's ability to conduct maneuvers in eastern Ukraine:
tl;dr: the Russian army has neither the experience nor readily available capability of conducting such a mega-offensive as we seen unfolding right now.
They may still pull it off, but this and other issues will translate into blunders and higher casualties.
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Answering The Call: Heavy Weaponry Supplied To Ukraine
The following list attempts to keep track of heavy military equipment delivered or pledged to Ukraine during the 2022 Russian of invasion of Ukraine. The entries below are sorted by armament category (with a flag denoting the country of delivery), and due to the confidential nature of some arms deliveries they can serve only as a lower bound to the total volume of weaponry shipped to Ukraine. MANPADS, ATGMs and commercial UAVs are not included in this list. This list will be updated as further military support is declared or uncovered.
(Click on the vehicle or equipment type to get a picture in Ukraine or abroad. When a picture showing the vehicle in Ukrainian service isn't available, or if the exact type of equipment pledged has yet to be uncovered, a link is given to the source)
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Also interesting:
Operation Z The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion
One of the most curious aspects of the Russian ‘special operation’ in Ukraine was how little effort the Kremlin had put into preparing its own population for what was about to be undertaken. The justification for the operation was made suddenly, over the course of about 10 days. In this it resembled the annexation of Crimea, despite being a much greater endeavour, suggesting that the Russian government wished to present it to the Russian public as a fait accompli. The lack of preparation of the information environment seemed encouraging for the Ukrainians. Protests began in Moscow, St Petersburg and further afield.35 In the first two weeks of the conflict, as the Russian war effort began to unravel, the Ukrainian government maintained hundreds of thousands of connections into Russian social media, distributing information about the war to swathes of the Russian population.
This window of opportunity was short lived. The Russian government moved rapidly to shut down independent media,37 threaten a 15-year prison sentence on anyone sharing non-official narratives on the conflict,38 and closed access to non-Russian social media.39 The results were highly effective. Although people in Russia can access external information sources through the use of VPNs, the measures meant that only those who actively searched for information would find it. This radically cut the number of people who were accessing non-Russian controlled media and also reduced the number of people who needed to be monitored by the FSB. Given close monitoring and the threat of imprisonment, these measures also reduced the internal circulation of information to circles of trust between likeminded individuals. Ukrainians reported that their families in Russia would deny that any military operation was taking place; probably as much a reflection of the threat of arrest as of the impact of propaganda. Ukrainian officials noticed that the breadth of their access to Russian audiences was cut ten-fold,41 and that once in the Russian information sphere their messages often remained with the recipient rather than being distributed more widely.
The initial euphoria at Ukraine’s withstanding the onslaught of the Russian Army has in some parts of Europe brought about a belief that Ukraine’s victory is now assured, or that an exhausted Russia may soon come to the negotiating table. Ukrainian victory is possible, but will demand hard fighting for some time to come. Having first done little to set a narrative about the war, the Russian government had an opportunity to lay the groundwork for de-escalation in mid-March. It made a deliberate decision to escalate its rhetoric and ideologically mobilise its society. By banning dissent, and by holding local officials accountable for the organisation of patriotic mobilisation, the Russian government is in the process of radicalising its public. Even as the cost of living in Russia rises, therefore, the intent in Moscow is to prolong the fighting. In the short term, this means a major offensive in Donbas. In the medium term, there is an intention to bring about a summer offensive to finish Ukraine off. Given that the Russian government has not yet curtailed its wider ambitions – as demonstrated by its designs on Moldova – it is critical that NATO remains firmly determined to not just support Ukraine to hold Donbas but to prepare for a renewed offensive after.
At the same time, a protracted conflict poses dangers for the West. As Europe enters summer, high energy costs will harm businesses, but there will be a delay between this and job losses. By autumn, there is a risk that recession will coincide with cooling temperatures while citizens will struggle to heat their homes. In this context, support for Ukraine may wither, engagement with Russian disinformation may rise, and Russia’s diplomatic efforts to evade sanctions may gain traction through Western disunity. Limiting Russia’s ability to protract fighting beyond the summer could be effectively enabled by reducing its access to modern armaments. To achieve this, Western countries must conduct a thorough assessment of where their companies are knowingly or inadvertently supplying Russia and cut off these channels. The severing of these channels will not alter the volume of munitions physically stockpiled by Russia for operations in the summer. But the expectations of future manufacture will both shape how much of the stockpile can be expended in Ukraine and the Kremlin’s confidence in the long-term security implications of continuing the war. Reducing dependence on Russian gas must also be a medium-term objective of European policy, even if it will not have an immediate effect. At the same time, NATO must be more engaged in the information struggle beyond its borders; Western efforts to manage their own energy crisis risk being perceived as imposing costs on the very states whose cooperation will be critical in bringing about Russia’s military and political isolation.
Although Russia has clearly been weakened by its battlefield setbacks in Ukraine, the combination of its imperial ambitions and significant coercive power risks destabilisation further afield. Moldova is the most prominent example, but as the conflict protracts, Russian operations could pose threats in Serbia and beyond. Coordinated efforts to curtail Russian malign influence in these states – and further afield – will be critical if the crisis in Ukraine is to be contained. Further crises, risking further economic disruption, will prove politically difficult to bear.
Finally, the Russian decision to double down is a high-stakes gamble. If Russia mobilises and eventually overcomes Ukrainian resistance then NATO will face an aggressive, isolated and militarised state. If Russia loses then President Putin has now begun radicalising the population in the pursuit of policies that he will struggle to deliver. Failure to defeat the Ukrainian state after relentlessly comparing it to the Nazi regime may have serious consequences for Putin and those around him. To frame a conflict as existential and to lose must necessarily call the suitability of a leader into question among Russia’s political elites. NATO states therefore need to consider how to manage escalation pathways that follow if Russia is not only defeated in Donbas but finds its newly mobilised and poorly trained troops, with few remaining stocks of precision munitions, unable to deliver a victory in the summer. The death of Putin’s political project is plausible, but it has already inflicted immense damage internationally and risks doing considerably more.
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Interesting piece on Russia's economic strategies.
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