The Ukraine war thread
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@Renauda said in The Ukraine war thread:
Another Russian airbase and ammo depots inside Russia hit in the last few hours:
Light ‘em up. Party’s on.
Is it too much to hope for to retake Crimea?
"My pronouns are FA/FO." - Mik, 2024
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Article by Sir Jeremy Fleming, Director of GCHQ, the UK’s Intelligence, Cyber and Security Agency:
It is a fallacy to say that cyber has not been a factor in the war in Ukraine. Both sides are using cyber capabilities to pursue their aims. Both sides understand the potential of integrating cyber and information confrontation with their military effort. And both sides know that they are engaged in a struggle for influence and opinion far beyond the immediate battlefield. It is a very modern digital and cyber war, as much as it is a brutal and destructive physical one.
Six months after Russia’s invasion, it is becoming clear how differing physical and virtual approaches have shaped the conflict. Just as with its land invasion, Russia’s initial online plans appear to have fallen short. The country’s use of offensive cyber tools has been irresponsible and indiscriminate.
Their information operations have proven clumsy and have been challenged by the release of intelligence. And Russian military attempts to destroy the digital infrastructure of Ukraine and to sow discord using cyber capabilities have been met with staunch, professional and effective Ukrainian cyber defence.
As the UK’s intelligence, cyber and security agency, gchq has long tracked the threat that Russia poses. With our allies we have an ever-evolving picture of its intelligence and military objectives in cyberspace. We have consistently called out their activities that go beyond responsible behaviour in cyberspace. We have challenged the ways in which the Russian state has turned a blind eye to the powerful criminal cyber groups operating with impunity in the country. And we have worked with industry and our allies, to operate in support of Ukraine, address disinformation and safeguard critical cyber infrastructure.
Although we knew that Russia was capable of playing by different rules, its actions in Ukraine have now shown this to the world. As a result, we are seeing a reshaping of the cyber landscape. There is now much greater co-operation between big tech companies and governments on security than before the war, a polarisation of positions on the use of cyber in war and a renewed effort to redefine cyber norms.
Looking back, we now know that the first shots of Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine were taken in cyberspace before bullets were fired on February 24th. The month before, Russian Military Intelligence deployed WhisperGate malware to destroy and deface Ukrainian government systems. And less than an hour before Russia invaded Ukraine, it targeted ViaSat satellite networks used by Ukrainian military, government and civilians. The attack spilled over into neighbouring countries causing collateral damage across a range of services, from wind farms to internet access.
Secret intelligence allowed us to spot this activity. The private sector spotted it too, and companies were quick to publicise and patch the problem. This partnership, between government and the private sector, which the National Cyber Security Centre (a part of gchq) plays a leading role in, has become increasingly important as Russian efforts to disrupt Ukrainian government and military systems have intensified.
Online disinformation quickly became a major part of Russia’s campaign, to cause confusion and chaos in Ukraine and beyond. Russia has used this playbook before, including in Syria and the Balkans. It aims to sow mistrust in information sources, to misrepresent Ukrainian actions and to promulgate false narratives about the reasons for Russia’s actions. We have taken action to counter these twisted truths. From providing warnings about the onset of war, to the rapid release of intelligence, and working with Western technology platforms to remove lies, we have shone a spotlight on the Russian state’s approach.
Much of this has been successful. So far, President Putin has comprehensively lost the information war in Ukraine and in the West. Although that is cause for celebration, we should not underestimate how Russian disinformation is playing out elsewhere in the world. Many of the most populous countries did not agree to the un motion censuring Russia for its invasion. Public opinion in those places matters and it is influenced already by the information coming out of Russia. This is a new front to the war in Ukraine and its effects will endure at least as long as the conflict does. We must take action to confront organised state disinformation campaigns and to ensure they do not succeed in blunting international outrage over Russia’s actions.
In all of these areas, we have seen the Russian state try to align and co-ordinate cyber capabilities alongside more traditional facets of military power. To date, this hybrid intent has not succeeded; the impact has been less than we (and they) expected.
In part, this is because Ukraine has proved itself to be an extremely effective cyber defender. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it has painstakingly developed a digital fortress. As we have witnessed heroic defence by Ukraine’s military, online we have arguably seen the most effective defensive cyber activity in history. Operating under sustained pressure against a very capable adversary, this team of industry, intelligence, security agencies and in some cases, citizens, has worked side by side to warn, respond and remediate.
These cyber defences proved stronger than Russia anticipated. Somewhat ironically, we’ve seen its military activity compound its problems. Russian strikes took down the very networks they were trying to infect. They forced the Ukrainians to diversify and use alternative forms of communication that were more secure. That actually enhanced Ukrainian resilience.
Thankfully, all of this cyber activity has not resulted in collateral damage outside Ukraine of the scale of the NotPetya attacks in 2017, which disrupted Ukraine’s banks, airports and more. This may be because Russian cyber actors are carefully calibrating to avoid escalation. Afterall, nato has made it clear that a serious cyber-attack against a member country could trigger Article 5, the alliance’s mutual defence clause. The danger of overspill to nato countries is very real—we’ve seen incompetence and carelessness by Russia before.
An important component of our response to this situation may involve the UK’s National Cyber Force (ncf)—a partnership between gchq and the Ministry of Defence. This builds out from our world class cyber defence and resilience, to deliver offensive cyber capabilities. I won’t go into detail about ncf activity—stealth and ambiguity are key attributes of cyber operations.
This secret and important work is conducted in accordance with international law and domestic legislation. It is authorised by ministers and scrutinised by judicial commissioners. It is this ethical, proportionate and legal approach that sets us apart from our adversaries and from Russia’s use of cyber capabilities in this war.
Learning the lessons of these early stages of President Putin’s war, it is hard to overstate the importance of Ukrainian cyber defence to the fight. The country’s experience has shown that online, the defender gets to choose how vulnerable they are to attack. And that we, as allies, show we are serious about the responsible use of cyber power. These are lessons that we and like-minded partners around the world must heed.
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Stolen from a list at the RWEC:
And outside Kyiv - a strike on a supply line:
Closer to the front, Kyiv also announced a number of strikes overnight behind Russian lines in southern Kherson province, including at a bridge at the Kakhovska Dam, one of the last routes for Russia to supply thousands of troops on the west bank of the Dnipro River.
"The Ukrainian armed forces treated the Russians to a magical evening," Seriy Khlan, a member of Kherson's regional council disbanded by Russian occupation forces, wrote on Facebook.
Supplies are definitely going to be an issue;
"Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08
The saying, "Lite is just one damn thing after another," is a gross understatement. The damn things overlap.
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To put it inti perspective, I heard yesterday on BBC World Service that the battle front in Ukraine in this war is the equivalent to the distance from Moscow to The Hague - roughly 1,367 miles. Correct me if I am wrong but I don’t think we have seen battle fronts of that size since WWII.
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I haven't followed this thread closely, so forgive if this content is repetitious. It is from Foreign Affairs magazine, published three days ago. To read the rest of the article, you can furnish your email and they will unlock it for you for free. Go here: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/playing-fire-ukraine
"Western policymakers appear to have reached a consensus about the war in Ukraine: the conflict will settle into a prolonged stalemate, and eventually a weakened Russia will accept a peace agreement that favors the United States and its NATO allies, as well as Ukraine. Although officials recognize that both Washington and Moscow may escalate to gain an advantage or to prevent defeat, they assume that catastrophic escalation can be avoided. Few imagine that U.S. forces will become directly involved in the fighting or that Russia will dare use nuclear weapons.
"Washington and its allies are being much too cavalier. Although disastrous escalation may be avoided, the warring parties’ ability to manage that danger is far from certain. The risk of it is substantially greater than the conventional wisdom holds. And given that the consequences of escalation could include a major war in Europe and possibly even nuclear annihilation, there is good reason for extra concern."
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I did not read the whole article, but what you quoted makes good sense. While it seems unlikely that it would go nuclear, that is no guarantee. The whole situation is illogical, at least from a Western point of view. Prediction becomes much more difficult once you have gone through the looking glass.
What I keep wondering is what are we not seeing that we should.
"My pronouns are FA/FO." - Mik, 2024
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Here's a little more of the article: "Furthermore, given each side’s determination to achieve its goals, there is little chance of a meaningful compromise. The maximalist thinking that now prevails in both Washington and Moscow gives each side even more reason to win on the battlefield so that it can dictate the terms of the eventual peace. In effect, the absence of a possible diplomatic solution provides an added incentive for both sides to climb up the escalation ladder. What lies further up the rungs could be something truly catastrophic: a level of death and destruction exceeding that of World War II."
The author, John Meersheimer, sounds really frightened.
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There has been no way to guarantee nuclear weapons will not be used, and has not been since 1945. Given their systems' performance to date, I rather doubt Putin has a yen to find out how good or bad his nukes are.
Still, it has to be a factor in decisions. We can't just say anything that has any such risk at all cannot be done.
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Considered by some in the West to be "Putin's brain,"[13] or "Putin's philosopher," Dugin is believed by some to have been the brains behind Russia's annexation of Crimea[14] as part of Dugin's advocacy for Ukraine becoming "a purely administrative sector of the Russian centralized state", which he refers to as Novorossiya.[15] Dugin is also believed to have laid the ideological groundwork for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[16] Dugin calls for an illiberal totalitarian Russian Empire to control the Eurasian continent from Dublin to Vladivostok to challenge America and "Atlanticism".[17][18]
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The author, John Meersheimer, sounds really frightened.>
Reading the author’s name, Mearsheimer, is enough for me, thank you.
Better to spend the next 2.5 hours listening to someone who actually understands Russia and this totally unprovoked and unnecessary war:
Link to video“Little by little I am learning the art of being quite content by doing very little slowly” ~ Lionel Hardcastle
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"Hell no! We won't go!"
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/08/18/they-re-not-counting-on-people-making-it-home
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Mearsheiner’s thesis is that the the West, and in particular the US, is determined to establish a global hegemony. He is currently regarded as a leading scholar in the Realist School of International Relations. In short, NATO expansion and the spread of liberal democracy into former Soviet republics is a direct result of this US policy towards establishing a global hegemony. Ironically, the Realist school looks back to George F. Kennan, the father of The Policy of Containment of the USSR as its inspiration. As former student in 1980’s of the Cold War , Kennan was indeed a major influence on many of us, myself included, who looked up to his writings on the USSR during Stalin through to the early years of the Brezhnev era. His publications in later years particularly during Gorbachev and into the Yeltsin period are the basis for Mearsheiner and followers of the Realist School.
Needless to say I do not buy into Mearsheimer’s claims. Russia is where it is today owing to choices made by its political leaders, Putin in particular. I do agree with Kotkin, the time of financial and political appeasement is over. Putin and his kleptocrats must be held to account. We are in a cold war with Russia for the foreseeable future. Hopefully the collective West has the ongoing resolve to contain future Russian expansion and stop it on the Ukrainian frontier. Right now Ukrainians are fighting and dying to keep Russia contained, the least we can do is supply them the means to defend themselves.
“Little by little I am learning the art of being quite content by doing very little slowly” ~ Lionel Hardcastle
