The Ukraine war thread
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The Russians are grinding them down, mostly by doing what the Russians do...lots of artillery and a war of attrition. The Ukrainians are very short on shells for their artillery and their isn't enough of donated artillery and shells for effective counter batteries.
Because of the pounding, they're losing soldiers they can't replace, from both casualties and desertions.
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A lot of wishful thinking to unpack here.
Kyiv’s Theory of Victory
"To avoid growing weary of the war and falling for misleading narratives, the West needs to understand exactly how Ukraine can win, and then support us accordingly. This war is existential, and we are motivated to fight. Properly armed, our forces can stretch Putin’s troops—which are already exhausted—past the breaking point. We can counterattack Russian forces in both Ukraine’s south and Ukraine’s east, pressuring Putin to decide which of his gains to protect. To succeed, however, the United States and its European allies must swiftly supply our country with appropriate numbers of advanced heavy weapons. They must also maintain and increase sanctions against Russia. And, critically, they need to ignore calls for diplomatic settlements that would help Putin before he makes serious concessions."
"Despite Ukraine’s early successes, it may be hard for Western policymakers to envision how we can defeat Russia’s larger and better-equipped forces. But we have a pathway to victory. With sufficient support, Ukraine can both halt Russia’s advance and take back more of its territories.
In the east, Ukraine can gain the upper hand with more advanced heavy weapons, allowing us to gradually stall Moscow’s crumbling invasion in the Donbas. (The Kremlin’s gains in this region may make headlines, but it is important to remember that they are limited and have resulted in extremely high Russian casualties.) The pivotal moment will come when our armed forces use Western-provided multiple launch rocket systems to destroy Russia’s artillery, turning the tide in Ukraine’s favor along the entire frontline. Afterward, our troops will aim to take back pieces of land, forcing Russians to retreat here and there.
On the battlefront in the south, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already carrying out counterattacks, and we will use advanced weapons to further cut through enemy defenses. We will aim to put the Russians on the edge of needing to abandon Kherson—a city that is key to the strategic stability of Ukraine. If we advance in both the south and the east, we can force Putin to choose between abandoning southern cities, including Kherson and Melitopol, in order to cling onto the Donbas, and abandoning newly occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk so he can hold the south.
When we reach this moment, Putin will likely become more serious about cease-fire negotiations. Our goal will still be to get Russian forces out of Ukraine, and keeping up the pressure may push Putin to accept a negotiated solution that entails Russian troops withdrawing from all occupied territories. Putin, after all, pulled Russian troops from the areas around Kyiv after encountering enough setbacks at the hands of our forces. If our military grows stronger and more successful, he will have good reasons to do so again. For example, it will be easier to present a retreat as an act of goodwill before further negotiations, instead of as an act of embarrassing necessity, if it is organized rather than hasty. Putin could even claim that the “special operation” has successfully achieved its goals of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, whatever this means for him. By publishing images of destroyed Ukrainian units and equipment, Putin’s propaganda machine will reinforce a message of success. Propaganda can also help Putin present the withdrawal as a sign of his humane treatment of Russian soldiers and as a wise step toward peace in general.
But if Putin remains intransigent, Ukraine can proceed farther into Luhansk and Donetsk until he is willing to negotiate in good faith or until our army reaches and secures Ukraine’s internationally recognized border. And whether Russian troops choose to retreat or are forced to, Ukraine will be able to speak with Russia from a position of strength. We can seek a fair diplomatic settlement with a weakened and more constructive Russia. It ultimately means that Putin will be forced to accept Ukrainian terms, even if he denies it publicly."
"Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08
The saying, "Lite is just one damn thing after another," is a gross understatement. The damn things overlap.
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I agree with the author that the Russian occupation must be stopped in the Donbas and not allowed to advance any further in the south.
Ukraine will be lucky not to come out of this war a land locked state. Likewise, getting Putin out of areas he now controls is wishful thinking. I do not see that happening any time soon.
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"My pronouns are FA/FO." - Mik, 2024
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@Jolly said in The Ukraine war thread:
You KIA 10K and that's a big deal. A really big deal.
Make it 30K. And a crapload of equipment.
https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/russia-has-lost-more-than-1500-tanks-in-ukraine/
Always remember, Operation Valkyrie was an act of sedition.
Warning: I post things that interest me. Read and comment at your own discretion. -
@Jolly said in The Ukraine war thread:
https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/russia-has-lost-more-than-1500-tanks-in-ukraine/
The "Weapons Tracker" site counts 848 tanks as of today.
But those are verified with photos.
Add 475 Armored Vehicles, 936 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 123 APCs and, well, you get the picture that that 1500 estimate is probably pretty close.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
"Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08
The saying, "Lite is just one damn thing after another," is a gross understatement. The damn things overlap.
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Regardless of the outcome, the Russian nose is bloodied will continue to get bloodied in the Kremlin decides to call a halt to the “special operation”. How long that halt will be continue is anyone’s guess. Throughout it all the Kremlin will plead innocence and that it acted in self defence.
Sooner or later however the Kremlin will want want to consume all time of Ukraine.
“Little by little I am learning the art of being quite content by doing very little slowly” ~ Lionel Hardcastle
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Question is, how bloody is that nose?
I know that Russia has been using a lot of older stuff, but the losses of equipment has got to be hard to make up.
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"Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08
The saying, "Lite is just one damn thing after another," is a gross understatement. The damn things overlap.
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Time for an operational pause.
Russian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Igor Konashenkov announced on July 7 that Russian forces in Ukraine are pausing to rest and regain their combat capabilities, confirming ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have initiated an operational pause.[1] Konashenkov did not specify the intended length of Russian forces’ operational pause. As ISW previously assessed, Russian forces have not ceased active hostilities during this operational pause and are unlikely to do so.[2] Russian forces still conducted limited ground offensives and air, artillery, and missile strikes across all axes on July 7.[3] Russian forces will likely continue to confine themselves to small-scale offensive actions as they rebuild forces and set conditions for a more significant offensive in the coming weeks or months.
Key Takeaways
- The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian forces are conducting an operational pause to rest and reconstitute.
- Russian forces continued efforts to advance toward Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and may be setting conditions to advance from the southeast of Barvinkove—either toward Slovyansk or toward Kramatorsk.
- Russian forces made marginal gains to the southeast of Siversk and continued offensive operations west of the Lysychansk area.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations to the south and east of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces conducted a limited and unsuccessful attack north of Kharkiv City.
- Ukrainian partisans are likely continuing to target Russian-controlled railways around Melitopol.
- Russian oblasts are continuing to create their own ad hoc volunteer units to compensate for personnel losses in Ukraine.
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Some interesting points:
Since we last talked, how have things looked internally in the Russian government?
The main thing is that, at least among the military, everybody now understands that it’s going to be a long, conventional war, not the small military operation they pretended it would be. And that is why some changes were made in terms of the structure of who is in charge of leading the troops on the battlefield. The military-intelligence agency was also put in charge of collecting intelligence information for the troops. [Previously, the domestic security service was doing so.]
Does this suggest that Putin has simply blamed the intelligence agencies for the war’s problems? Or is it that he has no option now, other than to turn even more to the military?
That’s the problem. He’s actually out of options. He’s quite limited. He got himself in a big war, and right now the military is finally quite convinced that they are fighting a really big war, not just some limited conflict. So what’s he going to do? He needs to vow to keep going in Ukraine. And he understands that he’s fighting a conventional army, not some group of Nazis. And the military thinking is that in this big war, the Russian Army is on the losing end, because the Ukrainian Army is a completely mobilized army that actually claims it can call on hundreds of thousands more in reserves. The Russian Army is still largely a peacetime army.
At the same time, the Ukrainian Army is given the best weaponry that the West can provide. And this weaponry is tested against the Russians and the Russians are not in position to inflict any damage on nato. They’re suffering heavy losses from the weaponry supplied by nato countries.
For many years, the Russian military believed that they had a chance to win a conflict with the West, not because they have better technology—they knew that the West always would have better technology—but because the West, and specifically the United States, would never sustain heavy casualties like the Russian Army can sustain, because, to the leadership, the cost of life is different. But in this war, in Ukraine, all the casualties are not by nato or by the American Army but by the Ukrainian Army. So even this cannot be played by the Russian Army. And that is why they think that they picked up a fight with nato in the wrong place.
You’ve said several times that this means it’s going to be a big, long war. What is the goal of that war? What does the Russian Army think it is trying to do?
The Army feels that it’s going to be a really long war. They believe that this pretense of running special operations should be abandoned and some people in the Army establishment are saying this openly. For instance, Vladimir Kvachkov—he’s a former colonel of Special Forces. He is respected in the Army because of his war record in Afghanistan. And he became prominent in 2005. He was actually charged with trying to kill Anatoly Chubais, a big name in the Russian reformist government back in the nineteen-nineties. Lots of Russians blame Chubais for the way reforms went in the nineties. So, allegedly, Kvachkov tried to kill him. He got caught and sent to prison, and then got acquitted and released. On May 19th, a statement signed by Kvachkov, which lots of people inside of the Army support, said that, Look, we need to admit that we lost the first stage of this war. The Special Forces part of the war didn’t work and the Russian armies were told to retreat from the Kyiv region and Kharkiv, so now we need to accept it’s a big war and we need to adjust our strategy. And I talked to some people inside of the military, and they are supportive of this point of view.
But do we know what the goals of this war are?
No, that’s the most interesting thing. The thinking is that, look, we are sustaining heavy casualties and suffering a lot, so the goal of occupying the Donbas cannot be the objective of such a war. We need something a bit more ambitious, and some pro-military channels on Telegram have just conducted polls and asked their subscribers, “What do you think? When will the objective for this war be achieved?” And only six per cent of people said that it would be achieved with the “liberation” of the Donbas, while thirty-three per cent said it would be when the whole of Ukraine capitulates unconditionally. People in the military and people close to the military want something much more ambitious than what Putin is saying.
So, even if people in the military are still very much in favor of the war, there’s started to be more self-questioning about why things have gone so badly?
Yes. They think that the war is a necessity. That’s how they see it—like it’s unavoidable. But the way the military command is conducting operations, that is now questioned by high people in the Army and in the security services.
What’s the hope there, or what do you draw from that?
Maybe I’m too optimistic, but I think we have some new factor here in that Telegram is such a big thing in Russia, that it is probably the very first war where we have, if you can call it, some public opinion of the Russian military and some sort of discussion about the military, which is happening on Telegram, not always in open channels but in some private groups. People talk about what is going on. It is a new factor.
The veterans of the Russian Army are quite unhappy with the equipment their friends are given. So they’re gathering radios, medicine, armor, or, for instance, if they know that there’s some shortages in night-vision devices for pilots. It also started a discussion about why the Army cannot provide this kind of equipment. And that creates some sort of—well, it’s not pressure, but at least people have started talking inside of the military. They are talking about these problems.
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“Little by little I am learning the art of being quite content by doing very little slowly” ~ Lionel Hardcastle
