The Ukraine war thread
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On the propaganda front, a story on pro-Russia social media influencers operating on Western platforms: https://www.vice.com/en/article/wxneb4/ukraine-patrick-lancaster-journalist
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The Russians are grinding them down, mostly by doing what the Russians do...lots of artillery and a war of attrition. The Ukrainians are very short on shells for their artillery and their isn't enough of donated artillery and shells for effective counter batteries.
Because of the pounding, they're losing soldiers they can't replace, from both casualties and desertions.
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A lot of wishful thinking to unpack here.
Kyiv’s Theory of Victory
"To avoid growing weary of the war and falling for misleading narratives, the West needs to understand exactly how Ukraine can win, and then support us accordingly. This war is existential, and we are motivated to fight. Properly armed, our forces can stretch Putin’s troops—which are already exhausted—past the breaking point. We can counterattack Russian forces in both Ukraine’s south and Ukraine’s east, pressuring Putin to decide which of his gains to protect. To succeed, however, the United States and its European allies must swiftly supply our country with appropriate numbers of advanced heavy weapons. They must also maintain and increase sanctions against Russia. And, critically, they need to ignore calls for diplomatic settlements that would help Putin before he makes serious concessions."
"Despite Ukraine’s early successes, it may be hard for Western policymakers to envision how we can defeat Russia’s larger and better-equipped forces. But we have a pathway to victory. With sufficient support, Ukraine can both halt Russia’s advance and take back more of its territories.
In the east, Ukraine can gain the upper hand with more advanced heavy weapons, allowing us to gradually stall Moscow’s crumbling invasion in the Donbas. (The Kremlin’s gains in this region may make headlines, but it is important to remember that they are limited and have resulted in extremely high Russian casualties.) The pivotal moment will come when our armed forces use Western-provided multiple launch rocket systems to destroy Russia’s artillery, turning the tide in Ukraine’s favor along the entire frontline. Afterward, our troops will aim to take back pieces of land, forcing Russians to retreat here and there.
On the battlefront in the south, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already carrying out counterattacks, and we will use advanced weapons to further cut through enemy defenses. We will aim to put the Russians on the edge of needing to abandon Kherson—a city that is key to the strategic stability of Ukraine. If we advance in both the south and the east, we can force Putin to choose between abandoning southern cities, including Kherson and Melitopol, in order to cling onto the Donbas, and abandoning newly occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk so he can hold the south.
When we reach this moment, Putin will likely become more serious about cease-fire negotiations. Our goal will still be to get Russian forces out of Ukraine, and keeping up the pressure may push Putin to accept a negotiated solution that entails Russian troops withdrawing from all occupied territories. Putin, after all, pulled Russian troops from the areas around Kyiv after encountering enough setbacks at the hands of our forces. If our military grows stronger and more successful, he will have good reasons to do so again. For example, it will be easier to present a retreat as an act of goodwill before further negotiations, instead of as an act of embarrassing necessity, if it is organized rather than hasty. Putin could even claim that the “special operation” has successfully achieved its goals of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, whatever this means for him. By publishing images of destroyed Ukrainian units and equipment, Putin’s propaganda machine will reinforce a message of success. Propaganda can also help Putin present the withdrawal as a sign of his humane treatment of Russian soldiers and as a wise step toward peace in general.
But if Putin remains intransigent, Ukraine can proceed farther into Luhansk and Donetsk until he is willing to negotiate in good faith or until our army reaches and secures Ukraine’s internationally recognized border. And whether Russian troops choose to retreat or are forced to, Ukraine will be able to speak with Russia from a position of strength. We can seek a fair diplomatic settlement with a weakened and more constructive Russia. It ultimately means that Putin will be forced to accept Ukrainian terms, even if he denies it publicly."
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I agree with the author that the Russian occupation must be stopped in the Donbas and not allowed to advance any further in the south.
Ukraine will be lucky not to come out of this war a land locked state. Likewise, getting Putin out of areas he now controls is wishful thinking. I do not see that happening any time soon.
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@Jolly said in The Ukraine war thread:
You KIA 10K and that's a big deal. A really big deal.
Make it 30K. And a crapload of equipment.
https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/russia-has-lost-more-than-1500-tanks-in-ukraine/
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@Jolly said in The Ukraine war thread:
https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/russia-has-lost-more-than-1500-tanks-in-ukraine/
The "Weapons Tracker" site counts 848 tanks as of today.
But those are verified with photos.
Add 475 Armored Vehicles, 936 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 123 APCs and, well, you get the picture that that 1500 estimate is probably pretty close.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
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Regardless of the outcome, the Russian nose is bloodied will continue to get bloodied in the Kremlin decides to call a halt to the “special operation”. How long that halt will be continue is anyone’s guess. Throughout it all the Kremlin will plead innocence and that it acted in self defence.
Sooner or later however the Kremlin will want want to consume all time of Ukraine.
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Question is, how bloody is that nose?
I know that Russia has been using a lot of older stuff, but the losses of equipment has got to be hard to make up.
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Time for an operational pause.
Russian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Igor Konashenkov announced on July 7 that Russian forces in Ukraine are pausing to rest and regain their combat capabilities, confirming ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have initiated an operational pause.[1] Konashenkov did not specify the intended length of Russian forces’ operational pause. As ISW previously assessed, Russian forces have not ceased active hostilities during this operational pause and are unlikely to do so.[2] Russian forces still conducted limited ground offensives and air, artillery, and missile strikes across all axes on July 7.[3] Russian forces will likely continue to confine themselves to small-scale offensive actions as they rebuild forces and set conditions for a more significant offensive in the coming weeks or months.
Key Takeaways
- The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian forces are conducting an operational pause to rest and reconstitute.
- Russian forces continued efforts to advance toward Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and may be setting conditions to advance from the southeast of Barvinkove—either toward Slovyansk or toward Kramatorsk.
- Russian forces made marginal gains to the southeast of Siversk and continued offensive operations west of the Lysychansk area.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations to the south and east of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces conducted a limited and unsuccessful attack north of Kharkiv City.
- Ukrainian partisans are likely continuing to target Russian-controlled railways around Melitopol.
- Russian oblasts are continuing to create their own ad hoc volunteer units to compensate for personnel losses in Ukraine.