The Ukraine war thread
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But if you know anything about Russian military history, you know this early setback is nothing new. For more than a century its army has made a habit of failing early before it regroups, recenters around its strength—overwhelming firepower—and gradually (and brutally) exerts its will. And that’s exactly what seems to be happening now.
Which is why this writer predicted exactly this, after the initial setbacks. Right?
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"My pronouns are FA/FO." - Mik, 2024
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@Mik said in The Ukraine war thread:
But the economic pressures are mounting, additionally in Europe as it copes with some 6 million Ukrainian refugees and struggles to find ways to wean itself off Russian oil and gas.
I don't know if I buy this. In the short-term, sure. But Ukranians can work. They're skilled up, and many of them have adapted very well to working "remotely" (i.e., working in bunkers or in other countries because their houses were firebombed). They have a lot to bring to the table, and many of them won't even need to look for jobs. Add to that the businesses they might be bringing with them, and I think they're far more of an asset than a liability.
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All depends on Putin’s endgame or long term objectives. If he has given up on taking Ukraine or attaining regime change in Kyiv and now only looking to take the Donbas and the south then yes the author is correct. If Putin still wants to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and link with Transnistria then the author is wrong. In the long term Russia will not prevail.
The best that come from if this war is a military and political stalemate that will result in a fragile armistice for years to come. I would maintain that Putin’s original objectives, whatever they were on 24 February, were lost in the first two to three weeks of the war. So I find the author’s overall argument, not all that compelling in light of what we actually know at this point in time.
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Russia is apparently fielding 50 year old T-62s. So obsolete.
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Yeah, but casualties...
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/ukraine-casualty-rate-russia-war-tipping-point
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On the propaganda front, a story on pro-Russia social media influencers operating on Western platforms: https://www.vice.com/en/article/wxneb4/ukraine-patrick-lancaster-journalist
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The Russians are grinding them down, mostly by doing what the Russians do...lots of artillery and a war of attrition. The Ukrainians are very short on shells for their artillery and their isn't enough of donated artillery and shells for effective counter batteries.
Because of the pounding, they're losing soldiers they can't replace, from both casualties and desertions.
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A lot of wishful thinking to unpack here.
Kyiv’s Theory of Victory
"To avoid growing weary of the war and falling for misleading narratives, the West needs to understand exactly how Ukraine can win, and then support us accordingly. This war is existential, and we are motivated to fight. Properly armed, our forces can stretch Putin’s troops—which are already exhausted—past the breaking point. We can counterattack Russian forces in both Ukraine’s south and Ukraine’s east, pressuring Putin to decide which of his gains to protect. To succeed, however, the United States and its European allies must swiftly supply our country with appropriate numbers of advanced heavy weapons. They must also maintain and increase sanctions against Russia. And, critically, they need to ignore calls for diplomatic settlements that would help Putin before he makes serious concessions."
"Despite Ukraine’s early successes, it may be hard for Western policymakers to envision how we can defeat Russia’s larger and better-equipped forces. But we have a pathway to victory. With sufficient support, Ukraine can both halt Russia’s advance and take back more of its territories.
In the east, Ukraine can gain the upper hand with more advanced heavy weapons, allowing us to gradually stall Moscow’s crumbling invasion in the Donbas. (The Kremlin’s gains in this region may make headlines, but it is important to remember that they are limited and have resulted in extremely high Russian casualties.) The pivotal moment will come when our armed forces use Western-provided multiple launch rocket systems to destroy Russia’s artillery, turning the tide in Ukraine’s favor along the entire frontline. Afterward, our troops will aim to take back pieces of land, forcing Russians to retreat here and there.
On the battlefront in the south, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already carrying out counterattacks, and we will use advanced weapons to further cut through enemy defenses. We will aim to put the Russians on the edge of needing to abandon Kherson—a city that is key to the strategic stability of Ukraine. If we advance in both the south and the east, we can force Putin to choose between abandoning southern cities, including Kherson and Melitopol, in order to cling onto the Donbas, and abandoning newly occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk so he can hold the south.
When we reach this moment, Putin will likely become more serious about cease-fire negotiations. Our goal will still be to get Russian forces out of Ukraine, and keeping up the pressure may push Putin to accept a negotiated solution that entails Russian troops withdrawing from all occupied territories. Putin, after all, pulled Russian troops from the areas around Kyiv after encountering enough setbacks at the hands of our forces. If our military grows stronger and more successful, he will have good reasons to do so again. For example, it will be easier to present a retreat as an act of goodwill before further negotiations, instead of as an act of embarrassing necessity, if it is organized rather than hasty. Putin could even claim that the “special operation” has successfully achieved its goals of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, whatever this means for him. By publishing images of destroyed Ukrainian units and equipment, Putin’s propaganda machine will reinforce a message of success. Propaganda can also help Putin present the withdrawal as a sign of his humane treatment of Russian soldiers and as a wise step toward peace in general.
But if Putin remains intransigent, Ukraine can proceed farther into Luhansk and Donetsk until he is willing to negotiate in good faith or until our army reaches and secures Ukraine’s internationally recognized border. And whether Russian troops choose to retreat or are forced to, Ukraine will be able to speak with Russia from a position of strength. We can seek a fair diplomatic settlement with a weakened and more constructive Russia. It ultimately means that Putin will be forced to accept Ukrainian terms, even if he denies it publicly."
"Now look here, you Baltic gas passer... " - Mik, 6/14/08
The saying, "Lite is just one damn thing after another," is a gross understatement. The damn things overlap.
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I agree with the author that the Russian occupation must be stopped in the Donbas and not allowed to advance any further in the south.
Ukraine will be lucky not to come out of this war a land locked state. Likewise, getting Putin out of areas he now controls is wishful thinking. I do not see that happening any time soon.
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"My pronouns are FA/FO." - Mik, 2024
