The Ukraine war thread
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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30
April 30, 5:15pm ET
Further Russian reinforcements to the Izyum axis are unlikely to enable stalled Russian forces to achieve substantial advances. Elements of unspecified Eastern Military District units and several air-defense assets are reportedly deploying from Belgorod to the Izyum front to support likely degraded Russian units attempting to advance south of the city. These forces are unlikely to enable Russian forces to break the current deadlock, as Russian attacks remain confined to two major highways (toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove) and cannot leverage greater numbers. Several successful Ukrainian counterattacks out of Kharkiv city in the last 72 hours have additionally recaptured a ring of suburbs north and east of the city and may additionally force Russian forces to redeploy units intended for the Izyum axis to hold these positions. Russian forces appear increasingly unlikely to achieve any major advances in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct wider counterattacks in the coming days.
Key Takeaways
- A Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Kharkiv City will likely alleviate pressure on parts of the city that have suffered the most from Russian shelling and may force Russian troops from Izyum to re-deploy northward to support forces maintaining the partial encirclement of Kharkiv.
- Additional Russian forces are deploying to the Izyum front but are unlikely to enable any major advances.
- Russian troops did not make any confirmed advances to the southwest or southeast of Izyum or to the west of the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline.
- Russian forces in Kherson are pausing major offensive operations to improve their tactical positions and regroup to prepare for a renewed offensive to capture the administrative borders of Kherson.
- Russian occupation forces in Mariupol announced plans to consolidate their control over the city and intend to return Ukrainian citizens forcibly deported into Russia at some point in the future.
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If I could stop all the violence going on in Ukraine right now (as well as violence anywhere else in the world, for that matter), I would.
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I think Putin would be crazy to have his military attack one or more NATO nations because I don't think his military is ready to take on NATO forces.
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@MainerMikeBrown said in The Ukraine war thread:
I think Putin would be crazy to have his military attack one or more NATO nations because I don't think his military is ready to take on NATO forces.
His military wasn’t ready to take on Ukrainian forces. What Putin seems to do best is kick the shit out of any of his own people who disagree with him and persuade the rest of them that it’s for their own good.
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Since Putin's military wasn't ready to take on Ukrainian forces, than how is his military supposed to take on NATO forces?
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On the diplomatic front, the article surveys global responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and points out that many populous countries refuse the take side (some discussion on why), hence if weighted by population, only a "minority" of the world condemns Russia. Most of them are not taking side, including India and Indonesia, the two most populous democracies in the world.
Various reasons (justified or not) were cited by various countries on why they do not want to take side. One reference to Cuba stood out, a parallel comparing Russia's unease with having a democratic Ukraine at its border to the USA's unease with having a communist Cuba so close to the USA. First time I've seen this argument reported in American press.
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That Cuban analogy has been around for some years particularly among US analysts. One of its leading proponents is John Mearsheimer. I am surprised you haven’t come across it before as Mearsheimer is widely quoted throughout the English language media.
For the record, I do not believe it to be a valid comparison in the Russia Ukraine War.
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Now Germany has promised to deliver some much-needed artillery. From what I understand, the "Panzerhaubitze 2000" is pretty decent.
In December 2013, Raytheon and the German Army completed compatibility testing for the M982 Excalibur extended range guided artillery shell with the PzH 2000. Ten Excaliburs were fired at ranges from 9 to 48 km. Shells hit within 3 m of their targets, with an average miss distance of 1 m at 48 km.
Average miss distance of 1m at 48km? I have no idea how that compares to other similar systems, but that sounds pretty impressive to me. Oh, I just see that this accuracy is only when this particular super-expensive shell is used. Now I wonder how accurate the "normal" shells are.
I still wish we'd deliver much more weapons, and faster, but at least it's moving in the right direction. I'm afraid, though, that the time window in which the weapons can help is slowly closing.
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The M-777 155mm howitzer the U.S. is sending to Ukraine is notable for a few things...
- There is titanium used in certain parts, making the gun lighter than the Russian 152mm howitzer. The M-777 is air mobile.
- The M-777 out ranges the Russian gun.
- The U.S. is sending enough rounds, that the tubes will be shot out before the ammo is exhausted. What the U.S. is not doing, is supplying Copperhead rounds.
A good crew can emplace the gun in a little over ten minutes, then fire five rounds per minute using the M-777's GPS system.
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Remember, these numbers are only the losses that can be documented with photo verification. I'm sure the losses are higher, much higher than this.
The other thing to remember is that, for example, it's not just destroyed materiel....
For Russia:
- Tanks (600, of which destroyed: 313, damaged: 17, abandoned: 49, captured: 221)
- Armoured Fighting Vehicles (329, of which destroyed: 161, damaged: 1, abandoned: 37, captured: 130)
- Infantry Fighting Vehicles (656, of which destroyed: 395, damaged: 6, abandoned: 46, captured: 209)
Lots and lots of captured equipment that will be returned to the fight. I remember seeing a story claiming that the number of tanks that Ukraine has is now actually larger than at the beginning of the war.
For Ukraine:
- Tanks (149, of which destroyed: 64, damaged: 1, abandoned: 8, captured: 76)
- Armoured Fighting Vehicles (88, of which destroyed: 33, abandoned: 4, captured: 52)
- Infantry Fighting Vehicles (106, of which destroyed: 53, damaged: 3, abandoned: 9, captured: 41)