This looks good on Netflix

[George K]

By the way, part 1 of the final season of Ozark is up....

[Doctor Phibes]

@george-k said in This looks good on Netflix:

Oh, my. Yes.

I wasn't aware of this book by Harris.

And, of course, Jeremy Irons, ftw!

I've read the book - well, I had it read to me. I enjoyed it a lot. He's quite sympathetic to Neville Chamberlain in the book at least, who I feel has had a bit of a bum rap from history.

[George K]

@doctor-phibes Much of Harris's work is fun - Fatherland, Conclave, and now this.

Does the book differ from the TV in any significant way...should I interrupt my Bosch Binge for this?

[Doctor Phibes]

@george-k said in This looks good on Netflix:

@doctor-phibes Much of Harris's work is fun - Fatherland, Conclave, and now this.

Does the book differ from the TV in any significant way...should I interrupt my Bosch Binge for this?

I don't know, I haven't watched the TV show yet. I listened to the book over about a week driving into work a couple of years back - it's a good one to listen to while walking.

[bachophile]

@doctor-phibes said in This looks good on Netflix:

@george-k said in This looks good on Netflix:

Oh, my. Yes.

I wasn't aware of this book by Harris.

And, of course, Jeremy Irons, ftw!

I've read the book - well, I had it read to me. I enjoyed it a lot. He's quite sympathetic to Neville Chamberlain in the book at least, who I feel has had a bit of a bum rap from history.

Just finished the Netflix movie. His take on (Neville not Wilt) chamberlain that he went into the Munich agreement understanding full well the Nazis were not planning to keep the agreement but as a ploy to buy time to help England rearm for the coming conflict.

The recent Churchill based movie, the darkest hour, implied he was a naive fool who believed he was successfully appeasing Hitler and thus averting war but turned out to be dead wrong.

Maybe the truth as always lies somewhere in the middle.

[Mik]

@george-k said in This looks good on Netflix:

By the way, part 1 of the final season of Ozark is up....

Watched E1. It's reminding me a bit of SOA. It just goes on and on, deeper and deeper. But I do want to see how they wrap it up, whether the Byrdes get out or what it costs them.

[Ivorythumper]

@mik said in This looks good on Netflix:

@george-k said in This looks good on Netflix:

By the way, part 1 of the final season of Ozark is up....

Watched E1. It's reminding me a bit of SOA. It just goes on and on, deeper and deeper. But I do want to see how they wrap it up, whether the Byrdes get out or what it costs them.

The opening scene was a bit of a spoiler, no?

[Mik]

A bit.

Watched Munich tonight. Interesting treatment on Chamberlain's thinking. Jeremy Irons was perfect casting. The guy who played Hiter MUCH less so.

[George K]

@mik said in This looks good on Netflix:

The guy who played Hiter MUCH less so.

Yeah, talk about horrible casting. EVERYTHING was wrong about that actor.

[jon-nyc]

@george-k said in This looks good on Netflix:

An afternoon well-spent.

Some unnecessary preaching in spots, but it's good historical fiction based on "what could have happened."

Irons, as usual is great as the feckless Chamberlain.

Who played the feckful Churchill?

[Copper]

Now that you mention it, Mr Churchill might have been in there somewhere but I don’t remember him.

I guess if you are rewriting the Chamberlain story, it is better to leave Churchill out of it.

[George K]

@copper said in This looks good on Netflix:

leave Churchill out of it.

They did. LOL.

[Mik]

He was never mentioned at all, much less being in there.

[George K]

Along those lines, the opening chapter of Gladwell's "Talking to Strangers" deals with the meetings between Hitler and Chamberlain.

“Chamberlain’s negotiations with Hitler are widely regarded as one of the great follies of the Second World War. Chamberlain fell under Hitler’s spell. He was outmaneuvered at the bargaining table. He misread Hitler’s intentions, and failed to warn Hitler that if he reneged on his promises there would be serious consequences. History has not been kind to Neville Chamberlain.
But underneath those criticisms is a puzzle. Chamberlain flew back to Germany two more times. He sat with Hitler for hours. The two men talked, argued, ate together, walked around together. Chamberlain was the only Allied leader of that period to spend any significant time with Hitler. He made careful note of the man’s behavior. “Hitler’s appearance and manner when I saw him appeared to show that the storm signals were up,” Chamberlain told his sister Hilda after another of his visits to Germany. But then “he gave me the double handshake that he reserves for specially friendly demonstrations.” Back in London, he told his cabinet that he had seen in the Führer “no signs of insanity but many of excitement.” Hitler wasn’t crazy. He was rational, determined: “He had thought out what he wanted and he meant to get it and he would not brook opposition beyond a certain point.”

Chamberlain was acting on the same assumption that we all follow in our efforts to make sense of strangers. We believe that the information gathered “from a personal interaction is uniquely valuable. You would never hire a babysitter for your children without meeting that person first. Companies don’t hire employees blind. They call them in and interview them closely, sometimes for hours at a stretch, on more than one occasion. They do what Chamberlain did: they look people in the eye, observe their demeanor and behavior, and draw conclusions. He gave me the double handshake. Yet all that extra information Chamberlain gathered from his personal interactions with Hitler didn’t help him see Hitler more clearly. It did the opposite.”

“Winston Churchill, for example, never believed for a moment that Hitler was anything more than a duplicitous thug. Churchill called Chamberlain’s visit “the stupidest thing that has ever been done.” But Hitler was someone he’d only ever read about. Duff Cooper, one of Chamberlain’s cabinet ministers, was equally clear-eyed. He listened with horror to Chamberlain’s account of his meeting with Hitler. Later, he would resign from Chamberlain’s government in protest. Did Cooper know Hitler? No. Only one person in the upper reaches of the British diplomatic service—Anthony Eden, who preceded Halifax as foreign secretary—had both met Hitler and saw the truth of him. But for everyone else? The people who were right about Hitler were those who knew the least about him personally. The people who were wrong about Hitler were the ones who had talked with him for hours.
This could all be a coincidence, of course. Perhaps Chamberlain and his cohort, for whatever private reason, were determined to see the Hitler they wanted to see, regardless of the evidence of their eyes and ears. Except that the same puzzling pattern crops up everywhere.

[LuFins Dad]

We watched it yesterday, too. I am not fond of fictional stories that are set in actual significant historical events. I’m okay if the event is in the background of the story, if it’s just the setting but when it’s right up front ant the story is integral to the event and the event is integral to the fiction? No thanks… A novelization about those two days and a film could easily have been made that would have been just as engaging, just as thought provoking, and not had people googling “did that really happen”…

[Doctor Phibes]

@george-k said in This looks good on Netflix:

Along those lines, the opening chapter of Gladwell's "Talking to Strangers" deals with the meetings between Hitler and Chamberlain.

“Chamberlain’s negotiations with Hitler are widely regarded as one of the great follies of the Second World War. Chamberlain fell under Hitler’s spell. He was outmaneuvered at the bargaining table. He misread Hitler’s intentions, and failed to warn Hitler that if he reneged on his promises there would be serious consequences. History has not been kind to Neville Chamberlain.
But underneath those criticisms is a puzzle. Chamberlain flew back to Germany two more times. He sat with Hitler for hours. The two men talked, argued, ate together, walked around together. Chamberlain was the only Allied leader of that period to spend any significant time with Hitler. He made careful note of the man’s behavior. “Hitler’s appearance and manner when I saw him appeared to show that the storm signals were up,” Chamberlain told his sister Hilda after another of his visits to Germany. But then “he gave me the double handshake that he reserves for specially friendly demonstrations.” Back in London, he told his cabinet that he had seen in the Führer “no signs of insanity but many of excitement.” Hitler wasn’t crazy. He was rational, determined: “He had thought out what he wanted and he meant to get it and he would not brook opposition beyond a certain point.”

Chamberlain was acting on the same assumption that we all follow in our efforts to make sense of strangers. We believe that the information gathered “from a personal interaction is uniquely valuable. You would never hire a babysitter for your children without meeting that person first. Companies don’t hire employees blind. They call them in and interview them closely, sometimes for hours at a stretch, on more than one occasion. They do what Chamberlain did: they look people in the eye, observe their demeanor and behavior, and draw conclusions. He gave me the double handshake. Yet all that extra information Chamberlain gathered from his personal interactions with Hitler didn’t help him see Hitler more clearly. It did the opposite.”

“Winston Churchill, for example, never believed for a moment that Hitler was anything more than a duplicitous thug. Churchill called Chamberlain’s visit “the stupidest thing that has ever been done.” But Hitler was someone he’d only ever read about. Duff Cooper, one of Chamberlain’s cabinet ministers, was equally clear-eyed. He listened with horror to Chamberlain’s account of his meeting with Hitler. Later, he would resign from Chamberlain’s government in protest. Did Cooper know Hitler? No. Only one person in the upper reaches of the British diplomatic service—Anthony Eden, who preceded Halifax as foreign secretary—had both met Hitler and saw the truth of him. But for everyone else? The people who were right about Hitler were those who knew the least about him personally. The people who were wrong about Hitler were the ones who had talked with him for hours.
This could all be a coincidence, of course. Perhaps Chamberlain and his cohort, for whatever private reason, were determined to see the Hitler they wanted to see, regardless of the evidence of their eyes and ears. Except that the same puzzling pattern crops up everywhere.

Hitler managed to literally fool millions of people, in many different ways.

Why be surprised that he fooled this one, too?

What I find slightly annoying about the retrospective treatment of Chamberlain is that a huge number of the people condemning him later were awfully quiet about it at the time. It's always easy to kick a guy when he's down, but it takes a lot of courage to question him when he's the one leading the way.

[Copper]

@doctor-phibes said in This looks good on Netflix:

it takes a lot of courage to question him when he's the one leading the way.

I question Mr. Biden.

He is still leading the way, kind of, right?

[George K]

@doctor-phibes said in This looks good on Netflix:

it takes a lot of courage to question him when he's the one leading the way.

Peter Doocey laughed.

[Doctor Phibes]

@george-k said in This looks good on Netflix:

@doctor-phibes said in This looks good on Netflix:

it takes a lot of courage to question him when he's the one leading the way.

Peter Doocey laughed.

You laugh, but Chamberlain probably wouldn't have got away with all that "I have in my hand a piece of paper" nonsense in today's less obsequious environment.

People might think I'm unkind to the Daily Mail and its "read"ership, but take a look at this bit of fluff from the 1930's....


[George K]

In Gladwell's book, he makes the point that people are easily fooled by appearances, while ignoring the facts. He says that everyone (other than Eden) was impressed with Hitler. Churchill, who never met Hitler, saw him for what he was.

Gladwell goes on to make the same argument with respect to judges who say they can predict repeat offenders (They can't - a computer algorithm does it better), Bernie Madoff, Larry Nasser and others. This, he says, is because of our nature, as humans, to trust each other.

It's an interesting read. I don't know how accurate it is, but it's fun.